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1 In the academic world, Joseph Margolis is best known as the proponent of a particular
combination of radical historicism and robust relativism. In his publications, he argues
that  “humankind  is  the  measure  of  all  things”  with  regard  to  aesthetics,  history,
natural and social sciences, and philosophy. In doing so, he effortlessly interacts with
authors  from  the  continental,  pragmatist,  and  analytic  traditions.  His  book  Three
Paradoxes of Personhood is a collection of the three Venetian lectures and the Michael
Eldridge Lecture which Margolis was invited to give at Ca’ Foscari University of Venice.
These  highly  thought-provoking  contributions  should  be  of  particular  interest  to
pragmatist  scholars  working  in  the  areas  of  anthropology,  philosophy of  language,
social ontology, and political philosophy. 
2 The book begins with an excellent and very accessible introduction to the philosophy of
Joseph Margolis by Roberta Dreon, which familiarises the uninitiated reader with key
themes  from  his  work.  This  introduction  is  followed  by  Margolis’s  three  Venetian
lectures, which make up the bulk of the book, and then by his Michael Eldridge Lecture.
The two sketches by Jale N. Erzen that supplement the text convey a vivid picture of
the pragmatist philosopher at work as a thinker and as a speaker.
3 Dreon’s  introduction  to  Margolis’s  philosophy  puts  a  particular  emphasis  on  his
aesthetic work, but also includes an outline of his relativism, his constructivism, and
his historicism. In addition, Dreon provides a very helpful overview of the reception of
Margolis’s philosophy in Italy, which forms the background to his Venetian lectures. By
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acquainting  the  reader  with  Margolis’s  (sometimes  idiosyncratic)  conceptual
framework,  she  makes  the  text  approachable  for  a  wider  audience.  Of  particular
interest are the connections she draws between Margolis’s writings and the classical
pragmatists – for example, his development of Dewey’s concept of the human being as a
cultural animal.
4 Margolis’s  four lectures are structured around three paradoxes.  I  will  first  describe
these three paradoxes which form the leitmotif of his first three lectures, then provide
some comment on the three lectures in turn, before ending with some notes on the
Michael Eldridge Lecture, which can be read as a conclusion to the foregoing argument
and as an application of its results to political philosophy. When Margolis writes about
a paradox, he diverges from the standard definition of the term. Instead, he refers to a
philosophical  puzzle  which  refuses  a  solution  within  one  particular  philosophical
paradigm, but which requires a combination of two or more approaches that may stand
in considerable tension with each other. 
5 The paradox Margolis  addresses  in  his  first  lecture  concerns  the  transformation of
human primates into persons. Neither a purely Darwinist nor a purely intellectualist
approach can account for this problem. Thus, Margolis demands a revision on both
sides  in  order  to  conceptualise  human  beings  as  hybrid  creatures  that  mingle
“biologically and culturally acquired abilities” (p. 41). While evolution can explain the
development of prelinguistic conceptual abilities, it is only through the active use of
language that consciousness can arise. The paradox of the second lecture deals with the
vagueness and indeterminacy of our language, something Margolis terms as “mongrel
functionality”  (63).  Both  a  rationalist  reconstruction  of  human  language  and  a
therapeutic treatment of possible conceptual confusions are at a loss here. According to
Margolis,  mongrel  devices  fulfil  a  certain function within our language,  in  both its
philosophical  and its  non-philosophical  varieties.  They help us to signal  conceptual
puzzles which we cannot yet solve, and to avoid absurd phrasings. The third lecture
analyses the collective nature of enlanguaged societies and the question of whether
society is  based on mutual  understanding or  whether meaning is  based on societal
conventions.  Margolis  rejects  both  the  notion  of  society  as  a  mere  aggregation  of
competent speakers and the intellectualist notion of meaning as independent of any
form of collective life. Instead, he reinterprets Wittgenstein’s concept of the Lebensform
(form of life) in order to describe the mastery of language as “the very paradigm of a
collective practice” (123) in which the meaning of our utterances is rooted. Thus, we
can trace the meaning of our words back to this collective practice, but this is where we
reach bedrock.
6 Having outlined the themes of the three lectures, I will now consider each lecture in
turn in order to locate those themes in the dialogue between Margolis and his various
conversation partners and to identify common threads, such as Margolis’s continued
criticism of a rationalist version of pragmatism which he refers to as The Pittsburgh
School (naming in particular Wilfrid Sellars and Robert Brandom). Afterwards, I  will
connect these themes and threads with Margolis’s Michael Eldridge Lecture.
7 In his first lecture, “Persons as Natural Artifacts,” Margolis engages with (among many
others) Michael Tomasello on the one hand, and Brandom on the other. He applauds
Tomasello  for  recognising  the  crucial  role  of  language  in  human  development  but
criticises him  for  disregarding  the  continuities  between  human  animals  and  non-
human animals.  Interestingly,  he  discovers  a  precursor  of  this  confusion about  the
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continuity  between  prelinguistic  and  linguistic  capacities  in  George  Herbert  Mead.
While Tomasello  attributes  we-intentionality  to  human  beings,  Margolis  sees  this
capacity  already  present in  non-human  animals.  We  can  attribute  perceptual  and
nonlinguistic concepts to animals,  whereas discursive concepts are restricted to the
human realm. Thus, the solution to the first paradox is a concept of the human person
as  an  “artifactual  transform”  (54)  of  the  human  primate  which  presupposes
prelinguistic  conceptual  capacities  on  the  part  of  non-human  animals.  Margolis
contrasts this continuity thesis with Brandom’s inferentialism, which he interprets as
proposing  an  alternative  solution  to  the  problem.  According  to  Margolis,  Brandom
establishes the rational autonomy of our framework of reasoning and, consequently,
avoids any reference to nonlinguistic concepts in his explanation of human rationality.
Yet,  his  supposed  rational  autonomy  remains  merely  heuristic  and  “effectively
unsecured” (57).
8 Margolis’s  primary  conversation  partners  in  his  second  lecture  on  “The  Mongrel
Functionality  of  Ordinary  Language”  are  Noam  Chomsky  and  Ludwig  Wittgenstein.
Margolis acknowledges Chomsky’s contributions to the specification of the biological
resources necessary for the development of language. Yet, he is profoundly critical of
Chomsky’s reconstruction of universal grammar, because it ignores the import of both
evolutionary and cultural history. Chomsky attempts to reduce the variety of natural
languages to a common underlying formula, whereas Wittgenstein claims the opposite:
that  language  cannot  and  should  not  be reduced  in  this  way.  But  Margolis  is  not
satisfied with Wittgenstein’s therapeutic project of  dissolving conceptual confusions
either.  He  takes  the  famous  example  of  the  mind/body  puzzle  and  analyses  the
different  ways  in  which  it  has  been  treated  by  Descartes  and  Kant.  According  to
Margolis, our language can assume a mongrel function of remaining deliberately vague
on conceptual issues and keeping the conversation open to further specification. Thus,
neither  Descartes’s  dualism  nor  Kant’s  apperceptive  unity  solve  the  conceptual
problem of the relationship between body and mind, but they provide a “reassuring
picture”  (91)  which  helps  us  to  continue  to  use  these  two  concepts  both  in
philosophical  and  non-philosophical  language.  Descartes’s  and  Kant’s  concepts
function as temporary placeholders.
9 In the third lecture, on “Collective Individuals,” Margolis again engages with a great
diversity  of  authors,  but  the  two  who  stand  out  are  Charles S.  Peirce  and  Vincent
Descombes.  He  discovers  in  Peirce’s  Collected  Papers  a  first  move  away  from  an
understanding of society as a mere aggregation of individuals to society as a collective
unit.  In  his  article  “What  Pragmatism  Is,” Peirce  describes  society  as  a  “loosely
compacted person” (114).  Descombes adds  an additional  layer  of complexity  to  the
underlying  philosophical  problem:  he  sees  an  incoherence  between  employing  the
concept of society to refer to a collection of individuals and using it  to refer to an
individual  of  a  superior  order.  Margolis  disagrees  with  Descombes’s  verdict.  He
suggests resorting to the mongrel functionality of language in order to do justice to the
collective features that can be attributed to enlanguaged societies. While speech must
be ascribed to individual persons, meaning goes beyond the individual and involves the
collective.  Accordingly,  Margolis  suggests  a  reinterpretation  of  the  Wittgensteinian
notion  of  Lebensform as  “the  nominalized  totality  of  all  the  continually  evolving
processes (and all the contexts enabling the processes) of external and internal Bildung,
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that transform human primates into persons and issue in whatever human societies
thereupon do, produce, utter, enact, bring about, and Intentionally manifest” (99).
10 I  come  now  to  Margolis’s  Michael  Eldridge  Lecture,  which  bears  the  title  “Norms
Misjudged.”  The topic of this lecture is  the interpretation of societal  norms and the
question of whether they can be justified or universalised. In this lecture, Brandom’s
inferentialism is  not  explicitly  mentioned,  but  Margolis  engages  critically  with  the
Kantian enterprise which leads him to polemicise against The Pittsburgh School as one of
many “regressive revivals of rationalism” (127). Margolis begins this lecture by arguing
that  Kant’s  notion of  transcendental  necessity  cannot  be  upheld  in  the  face  of  the
history  of  physics.  He  concludes  from  this  that  Kant’s  application  of  a  regulative
principle  in  the  realm of  politics  and  morals  is  endangered  as  well.  At  this  point,
Margolis  begins  a  conversation  with  John  Rawls  and  Jürgen  Habermas,  whom  he
regards as “the leading Kantian-inclined moral-political philosophers of the twentieth
century” (130), in order to provide philosophical evidence for his argument. Comparing
the late Rawls of The Law of Peoples with the early Rawls of A Theory of Justice, he sees
Rawls  as  retreating  from  an  abstract  moral  universalism  to  the  “contingencies  of
ethical  practice”  (133)  and  to  the  non-universalisable  requirements  of  his  liberal
proposal. In Habermas, Margolis senses a deep incompatibility between the naturalised
transcendentalism of  his  discourse  theory  and the  pragmatist  manner  in  which he
reconstructs rational consensus. Margolis consequently suggests that transcendental
rationalism and methodological individualism must be abandoned, and, with them, the
notion  of  absolute  moral  norms.  Instead,  we  should  rely  on  cultural  memory,
contemporary ideals, future hope, and reasonable inquiries in order to construct a “
modus  vivendi […]  among aggregated  persons  and  collective  peoples,  among  all  the
diverse societies of our age” (140). Returning to the title of his lecture, Margolis rejects
any claim of a priority between moral norms and ethical values.
11 In sum, Margolis’s Three Paradoxes of Personhood provides an impressive and exemplary
intellectual  masterclass  in  thinking  through  the  issues  of  personhood,  language,
society,  and  social  norms  as  radically  historical  and  contingent  categories.  The
emergence  of  personhood  is  contingent  upon  prelinguistic  conceptual  abilities,
language  retains  the  vagueness  and  indeterminacy  it  acquired  in  the  evolutionary
adaptation  of  human  beings  to  changing  environments,  enlanguaged  societies  are
imbedded in contingent forms of life, and social norms can only be substantiated by
resorting to existing cultural practices. At the same time, all four categories are the
result  of  hybrid  processes  in  which biological  and cultural  factors  are  intertwined.
Margolis’s argument acquires its extraordinary force from his dialectical engagement
with a multiplicity of  conversation partners.  By indicating the shortcomings of two
opposite  approaches,  Margolis  creates  space  for  a  third  option.  He  also  puts
considerable  effort  into clarifying what pragmatism is  and what it  is  not.  Thus,  he
defends  the  pragmatist  thesis  of  continuity  between  nature  and  culture  against
Brandom’s  inferentialism,  which  he  interprets  as  a  rationalist  counter-proposal  to
pragmatism. Although Margolis’s defence need not be the last word in this debate, it
nevertheless provides a very useful starting point for further discussions. 
12 That said, Margolis’s great ability to engage with other philosophers can sometimes
make it difficult to follow his argument, as it is mainly developed in conversation with
other points of view. While this discursive style enriches his argument considerably, it
occasionally comes at the expense of stringency and clarity. And while he provides a
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fair treatment of his discussants in the first three lectures, I am a bit hesitant about his
analysis  of  Rawls’s  and Habermas’s shortcomings.  By reducing the tensions in their
philosophical  work  too  much  to  metaethical  considerations,  he  does  not  take
sufficiently into account their  political  and moral  thought,  neglecting,  for example,
that Rawls’s “overlapping consensus” is also based on political reasons. A third and
final point concerns a question regarding the mongrel functionality of language in the
philosophical realm: While Margolis rightly points to the usefulness of mongrel devices
in keeping philosophical conversations open to future corrections and specifications, I
would have liked to know more about the way in which such criticism and corrections
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